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I. INTRODUCTION
According to Thomas Carothers in a widely cited paper, The Rule of
Law Revival,' over the past two decades or so western nations and pri-
vate donors have poured hundreds of millions of dollars into rule of law
reform in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Central and
Eastern Europe:
One cannot get through a foreign policy debate these days with-
out someone proposing the rule of law as a solution to the
world's troubles. How can U.S. policy on China cut through the
conundrum of balancing human rights against economic inter-
ests? Promoting the rule of law, some observers argue, advances
both principles and profits. What will it take for Russia to move
beyond Wild West capitalism to more orderly market econom-
ics? Developing the rule of law, many insist, is the key. How can
Mexico negotiate its treacherous economic, political, and social
transitions? Inside and outside Mexico, many answer: establish
once and for all the rule of law. Indeed, whether it's Bosnia,
Rwanda, Haiti, or elsewhere, the cure is the rule of law, of
course ... . The concept is suddenly everywhere-a venerable
part of Western political philosophy enjoying a new run as a ris-
ing imperative of the era of globalization. Unquestionably, it is
important to life in peaceful, free, and prosperous societies. Yet
its sudden elevation as a panacea for the ills of countries in tran-
sition from dictatorships or statist economies should make both
patients and prescribers wary. The rule of law promises to move
countries past the first, relatively easy phase of political and
economic liberalization to a deeper level of reform. But that
promise is proving difficult to fulfill.2
In this paper, we briefly review the recent experience with rule of
law reform initiatives in Latin America, Africa, and Central and Eastern
Europe, drawing on more detailed case studies by the authors. We are
currently working on a similar case study on rule of law reform experi-
ences in Asia.
The claim that the robustness of a country's commitment to the rule
of law is a critical determinant of its development trajectory rests upon
both instrumental and deontological foundations.
1. Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 95 (1998).
2. Id. at 95.3. Case studies availahle from the a,,thcor nn nn file. with th ,-lih-n- ,f" tho 1/A,,, I
INT'L L.
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The instrumental perspective is strongly represented in the writings
and research of economists associated with the school of so-called "New
Institutional Economics," which emphasizes that the protection of pri-
vate property rights and the facilitation and enforcement of long-term
contracts are essential to raising levels of investment and hence eco-
nomic growth. These theories have been tested in recent years in a
number of cross-country econometric studies. At first glance these stud-
ies provide compelling evidence in favor of the optimistic claims that
law, institutions, and governance exert a significant and independent
causal influence upon development outcomes.
Typically, the focus of these studies is upon exploring the extent to
which various measures of institutional quality explain measures of eco-
nomic development such as levels of per capita income, growth, and
investment, and generally speaking the results support the optimistic per-
spective. These studies are now too numerous to survey individually, but
we think that their overall tenor can be captured by examining one par-
ticularly influential study entitled Governance Matters. This study was
undertaken by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobat6n, all of whom are
affiliated with the World Bank, as part of the World Bank's ongoing re-
4
search on governance.
The World Bank's governance project involves compiling a large
number of subjective measures of institutional quality-meaning data
obtained from either polls of country experts or surveys of residents-
and grouping them into six clusters: voice and accountability, political
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and
control of corruption. They describe these clusters as follows:
Voice and accountability: Measures the extent to which citizens
of a country are able to participate in the selection of govern-
ments and combines indicators measuring various aspects of the
political process, civil liberties, political rights, and the inde-
pendence of the media.
Political stability: Measures perceptions of the likelihood that
the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by
possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means.
Government effectiveness: Measures the inputs required for the
government to be able to produce and implement good policies.
Combines perceptions of the quality of public service provision,
4. DANIEL KAUFMANN ET AL., GOVERNANCE MATTERS (World Bank, Working Paper
No. 2196, 1999), available at http://www.worldbank.org/research; see also DANIEL KAUF-
MANN, RETHINKING GOVERNANCE: EMPIRICAL LESSONS (CHALLENGE ORTHODOXY) (World
Bank Discussion Draft, Mar. 11, 2003).
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the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants,
the independence of the civil service from political pressures,
and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies.
Regulatory quality: Includes measures of the incidence of mar-
ket-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank
supervision as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by
excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business
development.
Rule of law: Includes measures of "the extent to which agents
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These in-
clude perceptions of the incidence of both violent and non-
violent crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judici-
ary, and the enforceability of contracts."'
Control of corruption: Measures perceptions of corruption, rang-
ing from the frequency of "additional payments to get things
done" to the effects of corruption on the business environment.
Corruption is defined as "the exercise of public power for private
,,6gain.
Using sophisticated statistical techniques the authors of Governance
Matters created indices that measure institutional quality along each of
these six dimensions as well as a composite "governance" index de-
signed to measure the overall quality of governance in a society. They
then regressed these indices on three measures of development: per cap-
ita GDP, infant mortality, and adult literacy. They found strong
correlations between their measures of development and their measures
of institutional quality, i.e., both the composite governance index and the
six sub-indices, hence their conclusion that "Governance Matters."
Other studies using fewer (and, sometimes, alternative) measures of
institutional quality, and typically focusing exclusively upon measures of
economic development, have produced similar results.7 It now appears to
be regarded as a truism that the "rule of law" is causally related to eco-
nomic development. The evidence of a negative correlation between
5. For a critique of rule of law indicators used in this and other studies, see Kevin
Davis, What Does the Rule of Law Variable Measure?, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 141 (2005).
6. Id.
7. Important studies include: ROBERT J. BARRO, DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC
GROWTH: A CROSS-COUNTRY EMPIRICAL STUDY (1997); Christopher Clague et al., Institu-
tions and Economic Performance: Property Rights and Contract Enforcement, in
INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 67 (Christopher Clague ed., 1997); DANI ROD-
NIK ET AL., INSTITUTIONS RULE: THE PRIMACY OF INSTITUTIONS OVER GEOGRAPHY AND
INTEGRATION IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Res., Working Paper No.
9305, 2002).
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residents' perceptions of judicial unpredictability and growth and in-
vestment is also robust,8 and there is considerable evidence of a negative
correlation between corruption and investment.
9 Finally, a recent study
has found that the de facto--but not de jure-independence of a coun-
try's highest court is positively correlated with economic growth.'
° These
findings are all favorable to optimistic perspectives on law and develop-
ment.
It is worth noting, however, that proponents of constitutional democ-
racy have received only limited empirical support. Studies of the
relationship between the nature of political regimes and development,
and in particular whether democracy is more conducive to development
than other political regimes such as autocracy, have yielded mixed re-
sults. Some find that democracy has an insignificant effect on growth."
Others find evidence of a positive correlation between growth and vari-
ous indices of political and economic freedoms.'
2 One survey of these
studies reports that eight studies found democracies more conducive to
growth, eight found authoritarian regimes to be more conducive to
growth, and five found no significant difference.
3 If development is de-
fined in broader terms than economic growth, some studies find that
more extensive civil liberties and political rights have a significant posi-
tive impact on infant mortality and adult literacy,'
4 and democracy is
8. Aymo Brunetti et al., Credibility of Rules and Economic Growth: Evidence from a
Worldwide Survey of the Private Sector, 12 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 353 (1998).
9. See J. Edgardo Campos et al., The Impact of Corruption on Investment: Predictabil-
ity Matters, 27 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 1059 (1999); Paolo Mauro, The Effects of Corruption
on Growth, Investment and Government Expenditure, in CORRUPTION AND THE WORLD
ECONOMY 83 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997); Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110
Q.J. ECON. GROWTH 681 (1995); Shang-Jin Wei, How Taxing Is Corruption on International
Investors?, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1 (2000).
10. LARS P. FELD & STEFAN VOIGT, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND JUDICIAL INDEPEND-
ENCE: CROSS COUNTRY EVIDENCE USING A NEW SET OF INDICATORS (CESIFO, Working
Paper No. 906, 2003), available at http://ssm.com.
11. John F. Helliwell, Empirical Linkages Between Democracy and Economic Growth,
24 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 225 (1994).
12. GERALD W. SCULLY, CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
183 (1992). Scully uses Gastil's indices of political, civil, and economic liberties. See RAY-
MOND D. GASTIL, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD (1987); see also KAUFMANN ET AL., supra note 4;
Dani Rodrik, Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them,
at 35 STUD. IN COMP. INT'L DEV. 3 (2000).
13. ADAM PRZEWORSKI ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL INSTITU-
TIONS AND WELL-BEING IN THE WORLD, 1950-1990 178 (2000) (concluding that "there is no
trade-off between democracy and development, not even in poor countries"); Adam Przewor-
ski & Fernando Limongi, Political Regimes and Economic Growth, 7 J. EcON. PERSP. 51, 60-
61 (Summer 1993).
14. KAUFMANN ET AL., supra note 4.
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more conducive than authoritarian regimes to the promotion of economic
growth in ethnically fractionalized societies. 5
From a deontological perspective, scholars such as Amartya Sen in
his book, Development as Freedom,6 argue that a full conception of de-
velopment embraces more than simply income per capita or growth
thereof but rather embraces a wide range of dimensions of human well-
being that bear on the capabilities of individuals to live lives that they
have reason to value, including various freedoms such as freedom of ex-
pression, freedom of political association, and freedom of political
opposition and dissent. From this perspective, the rule of law, to the ex-
tent that it guarantees these freedoms, has an intrinsic value, independent
of its effect on various other measures of development and does not need
to be justified solely in these instrumental terms, although a commitment
to protecting these freedoms may also coincidentally serve important
instrumental functions.1
7
These differences in the normative rationales for the rule of law be-
tween instrumental and deontological perspectives engage a larger and
long-standing debate in the legal literature on the content of the rule of
law. One strand of this debate focuses on the procedural and institutional
characteristics of a country's legal system. For example, adopting a
minimalist content of the rule of law, Tamanaha argues that the mini-
mum content of the rule of law includes ensuring: 1) that the government
acts according to the rules produced in the political arena and respects
the civil rights of its citizens; and 2) that there is a judicial party to resort
to that embodies the ethic of treating all cases before it neutrally and
fairly. Tamanaha argues that one of the major sources of oppression and
rapaciousness in developing countries today is authoritarian govern-
ments.
The central premise of the liberal rule of law system is the pro-
tection of individuals from the tyranny of government. Law and
development theorists should be striving to devise ways in which
the rule of law model can be adapted to local circumstances and
15. Paul Collier, The Political Economy of Ethnicity (paper prepared for the Annual
World Bank Conference on Development Economics Apr. 20-21 1998) available at
http:/www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1072&context=csae.
16. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).
17. See Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (2002); Amartya
Sen, What is the Role of Legal and Judicial Reform in the Development Process?, Address
before the World Bank Legal Conference (June 5, 2000) (transcript available at
wwwl .worldbank.org/publicsector/iegal/legalandjudical.pdf).
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nurtured into maturity, rather than expending the bulk of their ef-
forts in tearing this model down. 8
To Tamanaha, the virtue of this minimalist conception of the rule of law
is that it avoids or at least mitigates charges of cultural imperialism in
transplanting vast bodies of substantive law, as well as universalistic
conceptions of appropriate institutions and processes, to developing
country contexts where distinctive social, cultural, and historical condi-
tions may render such universalistic prescriptions inappropriate.'
9
In a similar vein, Carothers argues:
The rule of law can be defined as a system in which the laws are
public knowledge, are clear in meaning, and apply equally to
everyone. They enshrine and uphold the political and civil liber-
ties that have gained status as universal human rights over the
last half-century. In particular, anyone accused of a crime has the
right to a fair, prompt hearing and is presumed innocent until
proved guilty. The central institutions of the legal system, in-
cluding courts, prosecutors, and police, are reasonably fair,
competent, and efficient. Judges are impartial and independent,
not subject to political influence or manipulation. Perhaps most
important, the government is embedded in a comprehensive le-
gal framework, its officials accept that the law will be applied to
their own conduct, and the government seeks to be law-abiding."
In a formal conception of the rule of law, a socio-political order can
claim to be an adherent to the rule of law where it is in compliance with
explicit, general, and validly enacted rules. This positivistic conception
of the rule of law does not demand any particular substantive content or
moral norms; rather, it measures the legal order against the presence or
absence of observable criteria that have been decided beforehand. As
noted, common criteria may include an independent and impartial judi-
ciary, laws that are public and apply generally, the absence of retroactive
laws, etc., but there is no fixed set of criteria which any given legal order
must possess in order to fall under the rubric of the rule of law. Deroga-
tions from the rule of law so conceived are closely akin to what western
administrative lawyers commonly refer to as the "denial of natural
18. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 AM. J. INT'L
LAW 470, 476, 484 (1995).
19. See Richard Shweder, George W Bush and the Missionary Position, DAEDALUS 26
(Summer 2004); Richard A. Shweder, Moral Maps, "First World" Conceits and the New
Evangelists, in CULTURE MATTERS 158 (Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington eds.,
2000); David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections
on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 1062.
20. See Carothers, supra note 1, at 96.
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justice" or constitutional lawyers contemplate as guarantees of "due
process" in constitutionally entrenched bills of rights.
Several criticisms have been directed at this conception of the rule of
law. In its emphasis on the form of the law, the formalistic conception
risks the rule of law being removed from the real consequences of those
laws as well as the actual state of the legal order. A substantive approach
to the rule of law is one that measures the outcomes of a particular set of
rules against standards such as justice or fairness. This approach is only
concerned with formal rules insofar as they contribute to certain goals
within the legal order. Unlike the positivistic version, which claims to
separate morality from rules, the substantive conception requires that the
law be grounded in a moral framework. In contrast, in its most stringent
form, the formalist position may permit the ascription of the label "rule
of law" to a legal system whose laws do not adhere to generally held
substantive moral standards, such as apartheid South Africa or Nazi
Germany.2' On the other hand, the substantive approach to the rule of law
largely entails equating the rule of law with a just legal system, hence
implicating debates about the substantive fairness of vast bodies of sub-
stantive law from property law, contract law, family law, environmental
law, tax law, labor law, human rights law, to social welfare law, etc. If the
subjectivity inherent in the underlying normative conceptions of a just
law gives rise to disagreements irreconcilable by consensus or justifica-
tion, the resulting conflicts over what constitutes "good" law threaten the
disintegration of the legal order.
These debates about the appropriate features of various bodies of
substantive law are strongly evident in the recent law and development
literature. Some scholars, such as those broadly subscribing to the New
Institutional Economics school of development, favor substantive laws
that provide strong protections of private property rights and alienability,
as well as effective enforcement of long term contracts.22 Other scholars
emphasize the importance of constitutional reform, an entrenched bill of
rights, and strong protection of human rights as necessary preconditions
for development. Human rights considerations may implicate a wide va-
riety of laws having discriminatory or disparate impact on different
segments of the country's citizens. Yet other scholars focus on substan-
tive reforms to a wide range of substantive bodies of law, e.g.,
21. For a discussion of different conceptions of the rule of law, see Matthew C. Ste-
phenson, A Trojan Horse Behind Chinese Walls? Problems and Prospects of U.S. -Sponsored
Rule of Law Reform Projects in the People's Republic of China, UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 64,
73-78 (2000).
22. See, e.g., DOUGLAS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND EcO-
NOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990); Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic
Development, 13 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 1 (1998).
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commercial and corporate law, tax law, family law, environmental law,
labor law, or social welfare law.
We make no claim in this paper to resolve, or even centrally address,
these longstanding debates between procedural and substantive concep-
tions of the rule of law. For our purposes, it is sufficient to assert, along
with Tamanaha, Carothers, and others, that a minimalist, procedurally
oriented rule of law is a necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition for a
just legal system. That is to say, whatever one's substantive conception
of a just legal system or its component parts might be, it is difficult to
imagine any normatively coherent or defensible substantive conception
of a just legal system that is not predicated on the pre-existence of a pro-
cedurally just conception of the rule of law.
Even adopting, as we do for the purposes of this paper, a largely
procedural conception of the rule of law, the evidence that we briefly
review in this paper suggests that many developing countries and coun-
tries in transition from authoritarian, centrally planned societies to forms
of democratic capitalism have often encountered formidable difficulties
in implementing even this minimalist conception of the rule of law, let
alone a more robust substantive conception of the rule of law.
For purposes of explication, we place the potential impediments that
these countries may encounter in implementing a procedurally oriented
conception of the rule of law into three crude (and often overlapping)
categories. First, these impediments may be what one might broadly de-
scribe as of a technical or resource-related character, where poor
countries simply lack the financial, technological, or specialized human
capital resources to implement good institutions generally, including le-
gal institutions, thus impairing their development prospects (whatever
one's conception of development), in turn making them poorer (in some
relevant normative sense), and in turn further diminishing their ability to
implement good institutions, hence a vicious downward spiral. With re-
spect to impediments to rule of law reform of this character, presumably
the general orientation of reform prescriptions entail either more effec-
tive or efficient deployment of existing resources devoted to a country's
legal system, a re-ordering of a country's domestic priorities and reallo-
cation of resources from other areas of expenditure to the legal system,
or the infusion of resources from external donors (in the form of finan-
cial assistance, technological assistance, or technical advice and
training). Indeed, on the instrumental rationale for rule of law reform,
governments lacking resources should be prepared to borrow the money
required to finance rule of law reforms and finance borrowing costs from
future economic growth and increased tax revenues.
Fall 20041
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Another category of explanation for impediments faced by develop-
ing countries to rule of law reform relates to a variety of factors that
might loosely be placed under the rubric of social, cultural, and histori-
cal factors that have yielded a set of social values, norms, attitudes, or
practices that are inhospitable to even a minimalist conception of the rule
of law.23 While deeply entrenched social values, attitudes, and practices
are presumably amenable to change through time, 24 the policy prescrip-
tions entailed in overcoming this class of impediment are not nearly as
obvious as in the case of technical or resource-related impediments nor
is any impact likely to be immediate or dramatic. Indeed, scholars such
as Upham argue that the relatively limited role played by formal legal
institutions in post-war Japan, in contemporary China, and in other parts
of Asia, have not been inconsistent with dramatic progress in economic
development. In particular, the so-called China enigma--dramatic eco-
nomic growth in a context of weak rule of law institutions-has attracted
increasing scholarly attention that tends to identify the role of largely
autonomous local governments and Town and Village Enterprises
(TVE's) and the role of relational contracting in large ethnic Chinese
business networks (guanxi) as mediating factors.26 In any event, one
might reasonably argue that this weak role for the rule of law has been
inconsistent with broader or non-instrumental conceptions of develop-
ment, such as Sen's conception of development as freedom, as reflected
in the Tiananmen Square tragedy or other systematic human rights
abuses in China.27 Moreover, the skeptical view of the importance of the
rule of law in development in Asia tends to discount unduly the fact that
judiciaries, prosecutorial regimes, police, correctional systems, tax ad-
ministrations, private bars, and legal education institutions already exist
in all these countries: they have not been imposed by alien powers and
presumably are intended to play some necessary or important domestic
social function.
23. See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the Rule
of Law, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2275, 2322 (2003).
24. See various contributions in CULTURE MATTERS (Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel
P. Huntington eds., 2000).
25. FRANK UPHAM, MYTHMAKING IN THE RULE OF LAW ORTHODOXY (Carnegie En-
dowment for Int'l Peace, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Working Paper No. 30, 2002).
26. See Donald C. Clarke, Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The
China Problem, 51 AM. J. Comp. L. 89, 101-04 (2003); Graham Mayeda, Appreciate the Dif-
ference: The Role of Domestic Norms in Law and Development Reform-Lessons from Chinaand Japan (2004) (unpublished research paper, University of Toronto Law School, on file with
authors).
27. See, e.g., Inoue Tatsuo, Liberal Democracy and Asian Orientalism, in THE EAST
ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 27 (Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999).
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A third class of potential impediments to effective implementation of
even a minimalist conception of the rule of law might be loosely charac-
terized as political economy-based impediments, where lack of effective
political demand for reforms, on the one hand, and vested supply-side
interests, on the other, render these reforms politically difficult to realize
even if (by assumption) they would render most citizens better off in
terms of their own values. On the demand side, because the minimalist,
procedurally oriented conception of the rule of law has many of the
characteristics of a public good, diffuse citizen commitment to the rule
of law is unlikely to translate into effective political mobilization for re-
forms. Instead, more particularized citizen grievances are likely to be
channelled directly into the legislative or executive decision-making
process. As well, one should not na'fvely assume that all external con-
stituencies are likely to benefit from rule of law reform. Indeed, those
who derive benefits from corruption, cronyism, favoritism, etc., in exist-
ing institutional arrangements and legal processes are likely to resist
such reforms .
On the supply side, vested or incumbent interests in institutions or
processes that do not comport even with a minimalist, procedurally ori-
ented conception of the rule of law (e.g., a corrupt or incompetent
judiciary, public prosecution, police, correctional system, tax administra-
tion, or other specialized law enforcement, administrative or regulatory
agencies, members of the private bar, and legal education institutions)
are likely to resist such reforms, unless creative strategies can be devised
for mitigating their opposition, such as the creation of competing or par-
allel institutions (e.g., alternative dispute settlement, private law schools,
commercial arbitration, grandfathering, or buy-outs of incumbents).
Drawing on evidence from rule of law reform experience in Latin
America, Africa, and Central and Eastern Europe, we conclude that
while the first two classes of impediments to rule of law reform have
some salience in particular contexts, the primary impediment to rule of
law reform in most contexts is political economy considerations which,
despite understandable efforts especially by external donors to de-
politicize rule of law reform, require central engagement with the poli-
tics of rule of law reform in these contexts 9 and the development of
28. See THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE
163-77 (1999); Karla Hoff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, After the Big Bang?: Obstacles to the Emer-
gence to the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Societies (World Bank, Working Paper No. 9282,
Oct. 2002); KAUFMANN, supra note 4.
29. See CAROTHERS, supra note 28; Carothers, supra note 1; HARRY BLAIR & GARY
HANSEN, WEIGHING IN ON THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: STRATEGIC APPROACHES FOR DONOR-
SUPPORTED RULE OF LAW PROGRAMS (USAID Program and Operations Assessment Report
No. 7, Feb. 1994).
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strategies to change the political dynamics surrounding particular rule of
law reform initiatives-not necessarily a short-term, comfortable, or
low-risk strategy for either domestic or external proponents of reform
but without which major rule of law reform initiatives will likely be seri-
ously compromised from the outset.
II. ELEMENTS OF A PROCEDURAL CONCEPTION
OF THE RULE OF LAW
In this section, we briefly discuss the character of optimal institu-
tional arrangements implicated in the creation of a robust, albeit
procedurally oriented, conception of the rule of law. This discussion is
intended to animate examples from the case studies that follow, and, in
particular, to provide a benchmark against which the extant rule of law
arrangements can be evaluated.
A. Judiciary
Over the past decade or so, the judiciary has been the focal point of
rule of law reform efforts in the developing world. This attention derives
from the central role that an independent, effective, and non-corrupt ju-
diciary plays in promotion of the rule of law in society. It also reflects
the judiciary's role in ensuring the lawful exercise of public powers by
members of the executive or legislative branches of government. 0 The
United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary
(Basic Principles), 3' adopted by the General Assembly in 1985, sets out a
number of different principles governing an effective and independent
judiciary, including the need for appropriate resources, mandates, train-
ing, and selection processes. Provisions categorized under "Conditions
of Service" in the Basic Principles provide a template for a desirable
contractual arrangement (including compensation) between the public
and members of the judiciary. The Basic Principles also seek to guaran-
tee security of tenure of judges (whether appointed or elected) until the
age of mandatory retirement or the end of their official term in office.
Further, the Basic Principles require promotion to be based on objective
factors. Professional secrecy and confidentiality are emphasized in the
30. RAFAEL LA PORTA ET AL., JUDICIAL CHECKS AND BALANCES (Nat'l Bureau Econ.
Res. Working Paper No. 9775, 2003), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w9775.pdf
31. The Basic Principles were adopted by the 7th UN Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and Torture in Milan, Italy held from 26 August-6 September 1985 and were endorsed
by the General Assembly on 29 November 1985. See G.A. Res 40/32, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/32 (1985) [hereinafter Basic Principles].
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Basic Principles, and judges are granted immunity from any civil suits
arising out of performance of their functions.
Although judicial efficiency is not a traditional characteristic of the
rule of law, it-like judicial independence-is grounded in the ideal of
fairness. Protracted case processing times and overburdened administra-
tive staff may lead to resource-privileged individuals dominating the
court's time to the detriment of those who have fewer resources with
which to exert influence. Those with limited access to justice may resort
to extra-legal or illegal means of resolving conflict such as coercion or
physical violence. Thus another function of the judiciary and the courts
is to assist in the efficient and timely resolution of disputes.3
2 Reforms in
this area are largely of a technical sort and can be divided into two gen-
eral categories-material assistance and procedural reform.
33 Material
assistance consists of resource contributions ranging from management
training to computer technology, and it forms a significant part of fund-
ing expenditures in judicial reform projects. Procedural reform is
focused on the law itself and involves the rewriting of the rules of proce-
dure in order to reduce or eliminate duplicative or otherwise inefficient
rules and practices. 4 These types of reforms contribute to the overall
quality and accessibility of the judiciary.
B. Access to Justice
Another component of rule of law reform is access to justice. It is
not sufficient that good rule of law institutions exist in a society; they
must also be accessible to all-both formally and functionally. At one
level, this requires the creation of institutional arrangements that are ca-
pable of being accessed by a broad cross-section of the public. At
another level, it requires the provision of targeted resources to those in-
dividuals who require legal representation when they come into contact
with the legal system. For instance, Article 14(3)(d) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the General Assem-
bly of the United Nations in 1966, guarantees a person's right to legal
31
representation when accused of a crime, regardless of the ability to pay.
32. MARIA DAKOLIAS, COURT PERFORMANCE AROUND THE WORLD: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE (World Bank Tech. Paper No. 430, 1999).
33. See Richard E. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey of
the Issues, 14 THE WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117 (1999), available at
www.worldbank.org/research/joumals/wbro/bsfeb99/judicial.htm.
34. See id.
35. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature, Dec. 16,
1966, art. 14, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, U.N. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16,
at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entry into force Mar. 23, 1976).
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C. Prosecutors
In 1999, the International Association of Prosecutors (IAP), an NGO
composed of prosecutors from sixty-eight countries and several regions,
implemented a set of standards with which members should comply and
with which applicants from new member countries must demonstrate
compliance.36 The standards are composed of behavioral guidelines
aimed at achieving the following goals: a high level of professional con-
duct, a prescribed role within criminal proceedings, impartiality,
independence, cooperation, and empowerment. In its preamble, the code
of standards refers to a set of guidelines on the role of prosecutors cre-
ated by the United Nations in 1990.
37
Prosecutors represent the public interest in holding perpetrators ac-
countable for their actions. Maintaining the integrity and quality of the
prosecutorial staff can occur through three possible means. The quality
of prosecutorial conduct is enhanced through participation in continuing
education programs, such as those aimed at improving awareness of hu-
man rights. The capacity of prosecutors to cope with legal challenges is
improved through development of clear guidelines that, in conjunction
with law enforcement officials, allow prosecutors to target specific areas
36. See Egbert Myjer, The lAP Standards, A Unique and First Step, Address at the IAP
4th Annual Conference (Sept. 1999), at http://www.iap.nl.com/myjer.html.
37. The guidelines created by the United Nations address the following aspects of the
prosecutor's duties: 1) qualifications, selection, and training; 2) status and condition of ser-
vice; 3) freedom of expression and association; 4) role in criminal proceedings;
5) discretionary functions; 6) alternatives to prosecution; 7) relations with other government
agencies or institutions; and 8) disciplinary proceedings. With respect to qualifications, selec-
tion, and training, the guidelines mandate that selection criteria for prosecutors be formulated
such that they are free from discrimination and aim at procuring an appropriately trained staff.
Provisions regarding the status of service require shielding the prosecutor's office from exter-
nal interference, adequate remuneration, and merit-based promotion practices. The freedoms
of expression and association, with specific reference to subject matters such as justice and
human rights, are guaranteed for prosecutors. With respect to the prosecutor's role in criminal
proceedings, the guidelines require the independence of the prosecutor's functions from that
of the judiciary. The performance of their functions must be undertaken with impartiality,
objectivity, and the public interest as the foremost consideration. Where the prosecutor's office
has a certain amount of discretion, the laws and regulations must be formulated so as to pro-
vide guidelines that enhance fairness and consistency in discretionary functions. The
prosecutor's discretionary powers are also relevant in considering alternatives to prosecution.
Circumstances such as the negative consequences of conviction and imprisonment, as well as
those particular to the accused such as age, are said to be appropriate considerations in deter-
mining whether alternatives to prosecution will be pursued. Cooperation with other legal
institutions, such as police and public defenders, is emphasized. The final provision of the
United Nations Guidelines requires that disciplinary proceedings directed at prosecutorial
functions be undertaken in accordance with the law or lawful regulations. Guidelines on the
Role of Prosecutors, Eighth U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Of-
fenders, U.N. Doc. A/CONEI44/28/Rev.1 at 189 (1990).
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of concern such as crimes against children" or corruption in public ad-
ministration. 9 In addition, institutional mechanisms such as a complaints
process or a contractual arrangement specifying annual review can serve
as disincentives to prosecutorial misconduct. Media scrutiny of prosecu-
torial decisions can also serve to discourage corruption and increase
public confidence in the prosecutor's office.
D. Police and Other Law Enforcement Officials
The conduct of law enforcement officials is closely related to the
rule of law through the ideal of freedom from arbitrary treatment. 40 The
United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials,
adopted by the General Assembly in 1979, provides a template for ideal
law enforcement services.4' Composed of eight articles, the code pre-
sents broad principles; if implemented, these principles would have
significant ramifications for the practices of law enforcement officials in
developing countries.42 The term "law enforcement officials" is said to
encompass all officials of the law, whether appointed or elected, who
exercise police powers, especially the powers of arrest and detention.
The principal function of the police is to maintain law and order
through the provision of law enforcement services. The performance of
this function in accordance with a procedural notion of the rule of law
requires that police officials treat all citizens equally under the law. The
introduction of mechanisms that counteract the incentives for bribe-
taking and other forms of corruption, such as higher benefit and com-
pensation levels, may motivate performance of the function. In
38. See INT'L Ass'N OF PROSECUTORS, MODEL GUIDELINES FOR THE EFFECTIVE
PROSECUTION OF CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN, available at http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/
Publications/Reports/Children2.pdf.
39. Corruption in public administration has been a focus of the activities of the IAP.
40. See J. ALDERSON, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POLICE (1984).
41. G.A. Res. 34/169, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 186, U.N. Doc.
A/34/46 (1979).
42. Id. Article 1 requires that law enforcement officials serve the community and fulfil
the duties imposed upon them by law. Article 2 dictates that the performance of duties must
occur in accordance with human rights. Article 3 applies the principles of necessity and pro-
portionality to the use of force. The use of force is restricted to circumstances involving the
prevention of crime and the effecting of or assisting in arrest. Article 4 requires that confiden-
tiality be kept except in circumstances where disclosure is necessitated by the performance of
duty or the demands of justice. Article 5 categorically prohibits torture and other cruel and
unusual treatment of persons in custody-such treatment is said to be unjustifiable even under
orders from a superior or during public emergencies such as war, internal political instability,
and threats to national security. Article 6 requires that law enforcement officials ensure the
health of persons in their custody and obtain medical attention if and when necessary. Article
7 mandates that law enforcement officials will not engage in any acts of corruption, and take
active steps to oppose and combat corruption. Finally, Article 8 of the Code states that law
enforcement officials will adhere to the law and the principles stated in the Code.
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jurisdictions where organized crime has a strong presence, increased
public confidence in the ability of the criminal justice system to convict
and imprison the guilty would encourage police officers to risk their own
security by enforcing the law. Finally, as an ex post monitoring mecha-
nism, a complaints process administered by an external,
nongovernmental organization may help reduce official abuses of power.
E. Penal System
Several international documents elucidate how the rights guaranteed
to all persons by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights translate into specific
standards for the treatment of prisoners.4 '3 The United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted by the U.N.
Economic and Social Council in 1957, is the most comprehensive of
these guidelines. a The Standard Minimum Rules sets detailed standards
for the condition of food, clothing, housing, medical services, discipline
and punishment practices, institutional arrangements, and other aspects
of prison conditions.
In 1999, representatives from fifty countries across five continents
met at the International Penal Reform Conference in order to consider
new approaches to penal reform. The agenda for penal reform designed
at the conference identified crucial elements of a well-functioning penal
system. Some of these elements reflect broader principles applicable to
other legal institutions and include the following:
* The need for all accused persons to have a fair trial under due
process of law;
" Openness and accountability in all aspects of the operation of
the criminal justice system;
* Equal access to justice for all people, especially the poor and
the marginalized.
Elements specific to the penal system identified in the agenda included
the creation of informal and local dispute resolution mechanisms as an
43. See, e.g., Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF/611 (1957), Annex 1, E.S.C. Res. 663C, 24 U.N. ESCOR Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc.
E/3048, amended by E.S.C. Res. 2076, 62 U.N. ESCOR Supp. No. 1, at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988
(1977); Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 298, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/43/173 (1988); Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, G.A. Res. 45/111, U.N.
GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49A, at 199, U.N. Doc. A/Res/45/49 (1990); Standard Minimum
Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, G.A. Res. 33, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp.
No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985).
44. See Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra note 43.
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adjunct to the formal criminal justice system, the treatment of drug abuse
within the health or welfare system rather than the criminal justice sys-
tem, and the development of alternative sentencing or diversion (e.g.,
community service) options.
The basic function of the penal system is to safely imprison indi-
viduals convicted by courts until they are released back into society. Safe
imprisonment means that conditions in the prison system should, at a
minimum, meet the basic requirements for human security. Toward this
end, correctional services staff may require assessment and training pro-
grams that improve their awareness of human rights. Aspects of the
contractual agreement between prison staff and funding institutions may
require modification in order to reduce or eliminate incentives for prison
staff to accept bribes in exchange for biased treatment .4 In this context,
where abuses of power and deprivation of basic rights tend to be rela-
tively high in both developed and developing countries, a monitoring
system is crucial. In December 2002, the United Nations General As-
sembly adopted a treaty establishing a subcommittee authorized to make
periodic and ad hoc visits to prisons and detention centers in States that
have signed the treaty.46 Other bodies of the United Nations, government-
led commissions, local human rights groups, and international NGOs are
some of the organizations involved in monitoring efforts with a view to
improving conditions in penal systems around the world.
F. Bar Associations
Bar associations perform several functions within the legal system of
a nation. 4' The primary function of bar associations is the regulation of
the legal profession in the public interest. In collaboration with law
schools, whose function is the training of law students, bar associations
can affect the quality of the legal profession by the standards they set for
law school accreditation, curriculum requirements, and professional
45. The possibility that there would be an improvement in prison conditions if compen-
sation for staff were higher is suggested in a recent report by Human Rights Watch. See
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2001: EVENTS OF 2000 499 (2000), available at
http://www.hrw.org/wr2kl/special/prisons.html#monitoring.
46. Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. U.N. Doc. A/Res/57/199, U.N. GAOR, 57th
Sess., (2003), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cat-one.htm.
47. For a list of international and national organizations that monitor prison conditions,
see the list on the following Human Rights Watch webpage: http://www.hrw.org/advocacy/
prisons/monitors.htm.
48. The relationship between different legal associations and the legal profession varies
considerably according to jurisdiction; bar associations and law societies perform different
functions in different countries. For the purposes of this paper, we are using the term "bar
associations" in a general sense to refer to legal institutions that are involved in the govern-
ance of the legal profession.
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licensing or certification and disciplinary regimes. 9 These measures es-
tablish quality standards for membership in the profession. In addition,
bar associations are often key providers of continuing legal education for
practicing lawyers. ° In many developing countries, law school training
continues to be inadequate and continuing legal education can be a cru-
cial remedial measure."
A commonality in codes of conduct for lawyers is the obligation to
preserve their professional independence. 2 Ellis suggests that, although
the importance of independence is emphasized in regulation, the percep-
tion of what external influences are significant varies according to the
country.5 With respect to the independence of bar associations them-
selves, external factors often limit bar association activities. These can
include legal restrictions and obligations, state-imposed regulations, and
limits imposed by constitutions. The International Bar Association has
established a committee to investigate threats to the independence of bar
associations 4
The legal profession plays a role in safeguarding liberties against in-
cursions by the state, which may give rise to conflict between lawyers
and members of the judicial and political branches. This potential for
conflict partially explains the role played by bar associations in promot-
ing an impartial and independent judiciary. For example, the American
Bar Association conducts non-political evaluations of candidates for the
federal judiciary and provides a number of models to promote effective
state judiciaries. Policies and models, circulated by the ABA and used by
individual States, advise on how to strike a balance between judicial in-
dependence and accountability. In response to overt political pressures
on members of the judiciary in certain U.S. states, state bar associations
49. MYRNA S. FELICIANO, CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION: TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (paper presented to the United Nations Development Programme), at
http://wwwl .worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/continuing.pdf.
50. Quintin Johnstone, Bar Associations: Policies and Performance, 15 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 193, 206 (1996).
51. See Muna Ndulo, Legal Education in Africa in the Era of Globalization and Struc-
tural Adjustment, 20 PA. ST. INT'L L. REV. 487, 498 (2002).
52. Mark S. Ellis, Developing a Global Program for Enhancing Accountability: Key
Ethical Tenets for the Legal Profession in the 21st Century, 54 S.C. L. REV. 1011, 1014
(2003).
53. Id.
54. See International Bar Association, at http://www.ibanet.org/About IBA/cfm.
55. James J. Alfini & Jarrett Gable, The Role of the Organized Bar in State Judicial
Selection Reform: The Year 2000 Standards, 106 DICK. L. REV. 683, 687 (2002).
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Most countries have created specialized law enforcement, adminis-
trative, and regulatory agencies in a wide range of legal contexts. As an
example of such an agency we focus on tax administration which is a
function common to all countries.
Many developing countries collect only a small fraction of taxes le-
gally due, which undermines the government's ability to finance
effective public services such as health care and education. It has been
argued that complex tax systems are difficult to implement in developing
countries due to resource constraints and that existing problems in tax
administration may be partially due to the fact that these systems were
modeled on those used in highly developed countries. This implies that
an ideal tax system may differ from country to country, depending on the
economic and cultural constraints faced by individual governments.
Based on studies of tax administration reforms, Bird argues that reform
efforts have been overly focused on information management systems
while paying too little attention to designing institutional and individual
incentives that encourage tax officials to use the relevant information."
These considerations imply that the ideal tax administration system
needs to be both tailored carefully to the needs and constraints of a na-
tion, as well as more focused than it has been on providing appropriate
incentives to actors within the system.
H. Legal Education
Formal legal education supportive of a procedurally oriented concep-
tion of the rule of law cannot be devoted either to a purely formalist
perspective on legal education, which primarily emphasizes uncritical
rote learning of existing substantive and procedural legal rules or to a
single ideological conception of the rule of law in society, especially an
ideology that immunizes the incumbent political regime or elite from
external scrutiny and accountability. Instead, an effective formal legal
education is likely to be ideologically or normatively pluralistic and
should foster critical perspectives on "law in action" or "law in society"
56. D. Dudley Oldham & Seth S. Andersen, Commentary: The Role of the Organized
Bar in Promoting an Independent and Accountable Judiciary, 64 OHIo ST. L.J. 341, 344
(2003).
57. Richard M. Bird, Tax Administration and Tax Reform: Reflections on Experience, in
TAx POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 38, 40 (Javad Khalilzadeh-Shirazi & Anwar Shah
eds., 1991).
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through clinical legal education and interdisciplinary and empirical
teaching and research.
In the Introduction to this paper, we identified both instrumental and
deontological rationales for rule of law reform, the first focusing on pro-
tection of private property rights and enforcement of contracts as an
important determinant of economic growth, the second on basic human
freedoms as intrinsically valuable. The rule of law reforms reviewed in
this paper have largely a public law focus and might be thought to dis-
count the private law focus conventionally associated with property
rights and contract law. We believe, however, that the line between pri-
vate and public law is largely illusory; private law ultimately depends on
public enforcement of its norms through the application of force or coer-
cion, if necessary, by agencies of the State. Moreover, in poor
developing countries the problem of judgment-proof violators of private
property rights implies a larger role for the criminal justice system in
protecting property rights. More generally, it seems implausible to us to
imagine rule of law institutions that are seriously deficient in their public
law functions but virtuous in their enforcement of private law. Moreover,
to focus most rule of law reform efforts (as Posner advocates58) on prop-
erty rights and contract enforcement is to engage a very narrow political
constituency as proponents of reform and to forego the support of the
much larger political constituencies to whom formal property rights and
formal contract enforcement are of little immediate salience (and in
some cases a source of potential antipathy), but to whom protection
against abuses of basic civil and political rights is of general concern. In
these respects, private and public law should be seen as necessary func-
tional and political complements. 9
III. RULE OF LAW REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA, AFRICA,
AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
According to the World Bank's governance data on the status of the
rule of law in many countries throughout the world (reproduced in the
Appendix to this paper), only three out of eighteen Latin American coun-
tries had positive rule of law ratings in 2002 (Chile, Costa Rica and
Uruguay), and between 1996 and 2002 in many cases ratings deterio-
rated. In sub-Saharan Africa, only six out of forty-seven countries had
positive rule of law ratings in 2002 (Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius,
Namibia, the Seychelles, and South Africa), and many ratings again de-
teriorated between 1996 and 2002. In all twelve countries of the former
58. See Posner, supra note 22.
59. See Farber, supra note 17, at 97-98.
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Soviet Union, ratings were negative in both years. The countries of East-
ern Europe present a somewhat more positive picture. Asia (which is not
a focus of this paper), with its huge diversity of countries, presents a
much more mixed picture.
The recent experience with rule of law reform efforts in Latin Amer-
ica, Africa, and Central and Eastern Europe fully warrants Carothers'
conclusion that the promise of rule of law reform is proving exceedingly
difficult to fulfill.60 According to Carothers:
Rewriting constitutions, laws, and regulations is the easy part.
Far-reaching institutional reform, also necessary, is arduous and
slow. Judges, lawyers, and bureaucrats must be retrained, and
fixtures like court systems, police forces and prisons must be re-
structured. Citizens must be brought into the process if
conceptions of law and justice are to be truly transformed ....
The primary obstacles to such reform are not technical or finan-
cial, but political and human. Rule-of-law reform will succeed
only if it gets at the fundamental problem of leaders who refuse
to be ruled by the law. Respect for the law will not easily take
root in systems rife with corruption and cynicism, since en-
trenched elites cede their traditional impunity and vested
interests only under great pressure. Even the new generation of
politicians arising out of the political transitions of recent years
are reluctant to support reforms that create competing centers of
authority beyond their control.6'
Attempted reforms to the various classes of legal institutions identified
above exemplify these challenges.
In the case of judicial reform, much effort has been expended on
technical reforms designed to expedite court processes and improve ju-
dicial productivity through, e.g., installation of computers in court
offices, case management systems, oral hearing procedures, and profes-
sional training programs for judges. The evidence does not suggest,
however, that these forms of intervention dramatically enhance the qual-
ity of a country's legal system, standing alone, and even in their own
terms seem to have had modest impacts on judicial productivity, in some
cases being opposed by both members of the judiciary and members of
the private bar who stand to benefit from existing inefficiencies and de-
62lays in the court system.
60. See Carothers, supra note 1, at 95, 104.
61. See id. at 95-96.
62. See CAROTHERS, supra note 28, at 163-77.
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In terms of judicial independence, while a number of countries have
attempted to institute judicial councils to screen judicial appointments,
monitor for judicial incompetence or corruption, and institute discipli-
nary proceedings where warranted, these have often engendered severe
opposition from the legislative and executive arms of government (as in
Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, and Belarus) and senior members of the judici-
ary themselves who see such councils as an encroachment on the self-
regulatory traditions of the judiciary with respect to judicial conduct (as
in Argentina, El Salvador, and Bolivia). Judicial autonomy is asserted as
a trump on any form of external accountability.63
The quality of judicial independence varies considerably across Af-
rican nations, as reflected in independence in appointment, independence
in tenure, and adequate funding for the judiciary including appropriate
salaries. The judiciary in South Africa (at least in recent years) and in
Botswana is seen by legal practitioners as being relatively free from po-
litical influence, but this is rarely the case with respect to most other
African countries. As recently as the 1990s, judicial independence was
perceived as something of a novelty in Africa. As Yash Vyas points out:
During the colonial era, the judiciary was an integral branch of
the executive rather than an institution for the administration of
justice. The colonial administration was mainly interested in the
maintenance of law and order. It had no respect for the inde-
pendence of the judiciary or for the fundamental rights of the
ruled. The judiciary was that part of the structure which enforced
law and order. It was therefore identifiable as an upholder of co-
lonial rule. To an average citizen, the judiciary, as an instrument
of control of the executive power, lacked credibility and there-
fore enjoyed little respect.64
Under-staffed and under-resourced state courts in many African
States are seldom in a position to compete with highly resilient, locally
legitimate, and resource-independent informal community courts and
modes of dispute resolution.6 ' At the same time, however, the state-wide
promotion of the rule of law and the proliferation of inter-community
exchange and communication which accompanies the emergence of a
63. On the tension between institutional autonomy and institutional accountability, see
Michael Trebilcock, What Makes Poor Countries Poor? The Role of Institutional Capital in
Economic Development, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT (Eduardo Buscaglia
et al. eds., 1997).
64. Yash Vyas, The Independence of the Judiciary: A Third World Perspective, 1992
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 127, 131.
65. See Jennifer Widner, Courts and Democracy in Postconflict Transitions: A Social
Scientist's Perspective on the African Case, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 64, 65 (2001).
[Vol. 26:99
The Political Economy of Rule of Law Reform
stronger national government manifestly requires the strengthening and
expansion of the state court system as more and more cases involve par-
ties from different prefectures and cultural enclaves and cases beyond
the experience and competence of local fora. In some cases, however,
effective collaboration between state courts and local dispute resolution
fora may reduce the time demands on, and resource costs of, state courts.
In Botswana, for example, most land disputes, inheritance disputes,
stock theft cases, and petty criminal matters are effectively and quickly
resolved in neighborhood fora. On the other hand, in Uganda, for exam-
ple, the inadequate recordkeeping and inconsistent norms of
neighborhood fora have often required the state courts to hear a vast
number of appeals.
In the case of Russia, courts were historically low-level appendages
of and subservient to the Communist Party and despite atempts to secure
greater judicial independence and accountability though Judicial Qualifi-
cation Committee, financially desperate courts have become
substantially dependent on local government authorities and private
sources for financial support, which has severely compromised their in-
dependence. 66
Stephenson finds in a recent paper that, both theoretically and em-
pirically, judicial independence is largely dependent on long-term
democratic stability, a competitive political system whose major parties
reasonably anticipate alternate periods in government and in opposition,
parties who are sufficiently risk-averse and forward-looking to accept
mutual restraints (judicially enforced) on their actions, and judicial doc-
trine that is sufficiently moderate that it avoids the appearance of
political partnership. 67
With respect to prosecutorial functions, a number of countries in
Latin America that have been previously afflicted with civil war or mili-
tary dictatorships (i.e., Guatemala, El Salvador, and Chile) have had to
grapple with the problem that prosecutorial functions were often seen as
an extension of the incumbent political regime and hence became highly
politicized; prosecutions were widely utilized to silence or suppress po-
litical opponents. Establishing a politically independent prosecutorial
regime, staffed by competent, experienced, and non-corrupt public
prosecutors, has proven a formidable challenge on which only modest
progress has been made to date.
66. Todd Foglesong, The Dynamics of Judicial (In)dependence in Russia, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE
WORLD 62 (Peter Russell & David O'Brien eds., 2001).
67. Matthew C. Stephenson, "When the Devil Turns...": The Political Foundations of
Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59 (2003).
Fall 20041
Michigan Journal of International Law
The crime rates in many African countries are among the highest in
the world while the conviction rates are among the lowest. In the post-
apartheid period in South Africa, formally separate prosecutorial systems
were amalgamated into one system called the National Prosecuting Au-
thority. Attempts to tailor hiring so they would be more inclusive of the
marginalized black population resulted in experienced white prosecutors
leaving their positions and inexperienced black prosecutors entering po-
sitions for which they were not prepared. External donors have sought to
address the problem of inexperienced prosecutors through establishing a
Justice College which offers training for aspiring and existing prosecu-
tors. In addition, twenty-nine specialized courts have been set up to deal
only with rape cases in response to the high number of such cases and
low rate of convictions. Prosecutors in these courts are specially trained
in the issues surrounding sexual assault and only work in this area. This
form of judicial specialization appears to have been successful relative to
traditional courts; the average time to trial is lower and the conviction
rate is higher. The government plans to add more such courts in the im-
mediate future."
With respect to the prosecutorial function in Central and Eastern
Europe, the Procuracy during the Soviet regime held broad powers of
supervision over courts and administrative branches of the government,
and members of the Procuracy were considered to be senior members of
the local power elite and extensions of the Communist Party.69 Again,
establishing a prosecutorial regime independent of political influence
and confined in its functions to prosecuting cases before the courts has
proven a formidable challenge on which to date progress has been mod-
est.
With respect to reform of police regimes, in a number of countries in
Latin America (e.g., Argentina, Venezuela, El Salvador, Panama), the
police historically have been closely linked with or intertwined with in-
cumbent military regimes and were often major agents of political
repression and abuses of civil and political rights.0 Establishing police
forces that are politically independent, competent, and non-corrupt has
encountered similar problems to reforms of the prosecutorial functions.
68. USAID Office of Democracy and Governance, Achievements in Building and Main-
taining the Rule of Law: MSI's Studies in LAC, E&E, AFR, and ANE 144-45 (Occasional
Paper Series, Nov. 2002), available at http://www.usaid.gov/our-workldemocracy and_
governance/publications/pdfs/pnacr220.pdf.
69. Leon Aron, Russia Reinvents the Rule of Law, American Enterprise Institute Online
(2002), at http://www.aei.org/publications/publD.13781/pub-detail.asp; see also Stephen C.
Thaman, Reform of the Procuracy and the Bar, 3 PARKER SCH. J.E. EUR. L. 1, 22 (1996).
70. MARK UNGAR, ELUSIVE REFORM: DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN
AMERICA 74-112 (2002).
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In her comprehensive survey of policing reforms undertaken in Af-
rica since the 1990s, Alice Hills argues that changes to policing have
been largely superficial. The police, Hills generalizes bluntly, are still
"notoriously corrupt."'" Police forces formed from the remnants of post-
conflict militaries subservient to their respective regimes during the Af-
rican wave of democratization in the 1980s have not purged their
military legacies. "Policing," she argues, "continues to be characteristi-
cally paramilitary .... Discipline and protocol tend to be military in
character, though there often appears to be an unwillingness among all
ranks to accept personal responsibility for actions."72
Nor, it seems, has the function of policing changed from its conven-
tional purpose of protecting the regime in power: "African police
generally focus on the protection of regimes from domestic security
threats to a greater extent than police in many other regions; crime pre-
vention and the protection of life, cultural or religious values, and
property continue to be much less important. 73 This focus makes polic-
ing inherently subservient to the wills of the executive and legislative
branches.
With respect to Central and Eastern Europe, police regimes were
heavily intertwined with the Secret Service and the military and were
again seen as an extension of the Communist Party and major agents in
suppressing political dissent, often through flagrant abuses of civil and
political rights, with broad police discretion in many contexts rendering
them vulnerable to endemic corruption.
With respect to legal aid and access to justice, in most countries in
Latin America, Africa, and central and Eastern Europe, public defender
and related legal aid programs were and remain highly incomplete in
their coverage, woefully under-resourced, and often quite ad hoc in na-
ture, depending in many cases on private NGO-based initiatives or
student-based clinical education. In South Africa, until recently, legal aid
was provided principally though a judicare system where clients are re-
ferred to private practitioners who then bill the government agency that
administers the legal aid program (the Legal Aid Board) for their ser-
vices. The board has begun increasingly, however, to provide legal aid
through salaried public defenders typically employed in a network of
decentralized legal clinics. Other access-to-justice initiatives in Africa
include the establishment of public legal education programs by NGOs,
typically operating through university law schools.
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In a number of countries in Latin America initiatives designed to
promote alternative dispute resolution mechanisms at the local level
seem to have been quite successful. Progress has been made despite op-
position in some cases from the judiciary which has seen them as a
source of competition, even though, in fact, most of these informal, lo-
cally based ADR initiatives appear to be more complements to than
substitutes for the formal judicial system in that they address grievances
either local or small-scale in nature that, for the most part, have never
made their way into the formal court system.74
With respect to correctional services, most countries reviewed in our
three case studies commonly experience gross overcrowding of facilities,
underutilization of alternative sentencing regimes to imprisonment,
poorly trained personnel, and lack of attention to the legal rights of pris-
oners, contributing in combination to high levels of infectious diseases
such as TB and AIDS75 in the prison population and high rates of recidi-
vism. 76 In a few African countries, such as Zimbabwe and Kenya, efforts
to reduce prison overcrowding by developing community service pro-
grams seem to have been quite successful. Some NGOs, such as Penal
Reform International (PRI), have undertaken several reform programs in
sub-Saharan Africa, such as training of correctional personnel, develop-
ing community service programs, and providing paralegal advisory
services to prisoners.
With respect to tax administration, which we use as an example of a
specialized law enforcement agency among a spectrum of specialized
administrative and regulatory agencies within or semi-independent of
government, low levels of collection of taxes due as well as endemic in-
efficiencies and corruption in tax administration systems have
characterized most countries in Latin America in the past. In this respect,
some significant progress appears to have been made in several countries
in establishing semi-autonomous tax administration agencies, simplified
tax structures, simplified tax filing requirements, the utilization of banks
as first-tier tax return processors and tax collectors, and enhanced com-
pensation arrangements for personnel within these regimes, including
performance-based forms of compensation that are contingent on taxes
collected that offset incentives to forgive taxes due in return for bribes.77
74. USAID Office of Democracy and Governance, supra note 68.
75. Kevin Krajick, Russia's Prison Meltdown, Ford Foundation Report (Summer 2001),
available at http://www.fordfound.org/publications/ff-report/view-ff-reportdetail.cfm?
report-index=291.
76. For the South American experience, see International Centre for Prison Studies,
Projects: Central and Latin America, available at http://www.kcl.ac.ukldepstalrel/icps/
latinamerica.html.
77. Bird, supra note 57.
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In several African countries semi-autonomous revenue authorities
have been created which are not subject to the same resource constraints
as other public service programs. The main motivation for creating tax
administration bodies with more independence is to distance the body
from political interference and to allow for personnel policies that are
intended to reduce incentives for corrupt behavior, e.g., by allowing for
higher remuneration than is usually provided to public sector employees
and easier dismissal procedures. The results of these initiatives are
mixed. Studies suggest that they initially led to an increase in revenue
and a decrease in the perception of corruption, but recent evidence sug-
gests declining tax revenues and an increase in perceived levels of
corruption.78
In the case of Central and Eastern Europe, given the absence of a
private sector in the Communist era with revenues being raised largely
from state-owned enterprises, the challenge in the post-Communist era
has been to establish tax regimes essentially for the first time, focusing
mostly on large tax payer units.79 A number of these initiatives seem to
have registered significant successes (e.g., Latvia, Poland, Hungary, and
Bulgaria), while in other cases the initiatives are too recent to permit ef-
fective evaluation. 0 Perhaps more than in most areas of rule of law
reform, politicians have strong material incentives to promote more effi-
cient collection of taxes due and enhanced public revenues, whether their
motivation is to expand their political support through popular social
expenditure programs or simply to appropriate the revenue for them-
selves.
With respect to bar associations, throughout Latin America these
have generally been a weak force for rule of law reform, in part because
these associations entail voluntary membership and are often small, lo-
cal, and fragmented.8 ' Thus, they have little ability to set and enforce
standards for entry into the profession or to discipline members for
breaches of professional responsibility or ethics and are largely confined
to providing modest forms of continuing professional education services.
Indeed, in some cases, bar associations have opposed reforms to judicial
78. Odd-Helge Fjeldstad et al., Autonomy, Incentives and Patronage: A Study of Cor-
ruption in the Tanzania and Uganda Revenue Authorities (Chr. Michelsen Institute, R. 2003:9,
2003), available at http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication.cfm?pubid= 1688.
79. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Robert McNab, The Tax Reform Experiment in Transi-
tional Countries 3JJan. 1, 2000), available at http://isp-aysps.gsu.edu/papers/ispwpo000 .pdf.
80. KATHERINE BAER ET AL., IMPROVING LARGE TAZPAYERS' COMPLIANCE: A REVIEW
OF COUNTRY EXPERIENCE 24-28 (2002).
81. See the Inter-American Bar Association (IABA) contact page at http://www.iaba.org
for contact information of all IABA members; see the Hieros Gamos website, http://www.hg.org,
for contact information for a limited number of international, including Latin American, bar
associations.
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processes where members have benefited from the inefficient and pro-
tracted nature of these processes.
The role played by bar associations and law societies and other or-
ganizations representing the legal profession varies dramatically from
country to country in Africa, including whether or not membership in a
bar association or like organization is required for practicing law. In
many countries, the principal focus of bar associations and like organiza-
tions is providing continuing education services to their members. Some
law societies have taken a more activist role, including the Law Society
of Kenya which has adopted a major advocacy and legal assistance pro-
gram with respect to economic reform, human rights, and public interest
litigation. It has also been a severe and effective critic of judicial corrup-
tion. In a few cases, bar associations and law societies have sponsored
legal aid programs by providing basic legal information to the public on
a variety of matters ranging from rights upon arrest to wrongful dis-
missal.
In the case of Central and Eastern Europe, bar associations barely
existed in the Communist era and comprised small voluntary local
groupings of lawyers.82 Useful reform efforts appear to have been initi-
ated to promote bar associations in a number of these countries, but their
functions for the most part at present are confined to providing continu-
ing professional education services. Thus they do not play a major role
in setting professional entry standards or disciplining the conduct of their
members post-entry or in providing a major check and balance in the
general administration of the justice system.
Finally, with respect to legal education, in most Latin American
countries, admission to law schools (mostly public) appears to be open
to large numbers of students, against very relaxed standards and subject
to payment of minimal fees. Many of these students study part-time and
many law professors in turn view their professorial appointments as part-
time commitments that are combined with private professional or con-
sulting practices. The form of education appears to have emphasized
formal presentations by professors of doctrine and rote note-taking and
learning by students. The development of clinical education initiatives in
a number of countries has sought, with some success, to introduce a "law
in action" perspective into legal education, as well as facilitating access
to various justice initiatives for disadvantaged members of the communi-
ties in which these clinics operate. Efforts to broaden and render more
rigorous and demanding the intellectual perspectives on legal education,
82. William D. Meyer, Facing the Post-Communist Reality: Lawyers in Private Prac-
tice in Central and Eastern Europe and the Republics of the Former Soviet Union, 26 LAw &
POEY INT'L Bus. 1019, 1037 (1995).
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however, through, e.g., interdisciplinary and empirical study and re-
83
search, seem to have made much more modest progress.
Legal education through domestic institutions was almost univer-
sally unavailable in English-speaking African countries until
independence of the various countries from their respective colonial rul-
ers. Legal training in most African countries today is said to be overly
formalistic and rule-based so that students do not receive the opportunity
to cultivate flexibility and creativity in legal thinking, thus arguably lim-
iting their ability to address the legal problems that arise as a result of
the interaction between local and foreign contexts. One positive change
in African law schools is that education in international human rights
subjects is receiving more attention, and clinical education is becoming a
more important part of a law school education. In many African nations,
there exist informal mechanisms of dispute resolution, such as traditional
community-based mechanisms, where those overseeing disputes have no
formal legal training. In a few countries, initiatives have been undertaken
to provide basic legal training to those performing adjudicative roles in
these community-based mechanisms, including incorporating constitu-
tional and human rights into their informal decision-making processes."
In the case of Central and Eastern Europe, law schools have over-
whelmingly been public institutions subject to heavy, uniform, central
political control, with prescribed curricula heavily emphasizing the es-
sential identity of law and politics and the ideological foundations of law
in effectuating Communist ideology.
86 A high percentage of students in
Russia study by correspondence. To date, very little progress appears to
have been made in transforming legal education in many of the countries
of the former Soviet Union to reflect the centrality of rule of law values
in legal education. In both regions, legal education is an undergraduate
degree, further attenuating the interdisciplinary basis on which legal
teaching and research can build.
In light of this rather sobering reprise, what does the future hold for
rule of law reforms in these countries?
First, it seems clear to us that technical impediments to serious rule
of law reform are of second-order importance, and assume falsely in
many cases that all relevant actors share a commitment to realizing a
common vision of the rule of law within existing or potential resource
constraints.
83. Monica Pinto, Developments in Latin American Legal Education, 21 PA. ST. INT'L
L. REv. 61 (2002).
84. Ndulo, supra note 51, at 490-95.
85. USAID Office of Democracy and Governance, supra note 68, at 135.
86. George E. Glos, Soviet Law and Soviet Legal Education in an Historical Context:
An Interpretation, 15 REV. SOCIALIST L. 227, 259 (1989).
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Second, social, cultural, and historical impediments are clearly more
important, especially in post-conflict societies afflicted with deeply en-
trenched ethnic or religious factionalism or in post-authoritarian
societies, in disentangling legal institutions from repressive political re-
gimes in which they have been embedded and for which they have often
been active agents. In the case of Latin America, however, the heavily
compromised role of these institutions does not seem to reflect deep-
seated, longstanding cultural or social values that render most citizens
indifferent to rule of law abuses (as reflected in subsequent widespread
public denunciation and renunciation of these abuses). The evidence
from Africa tentatively points in the same direction. In the case of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, at least in the countries of the former Soviet
Union, Communist Party ideology pervaded all aspects of economic,
social, and political life, and hence ideological values, beliefs, and prac-
tices that are strongly antithetical to the rule of law are clearly more
deeply and widely entrenched. Optimistic views that the moment of ex-
traordinary politics surrounding regime change would provide an
opportunity for sweeping adoption of rule of law reform have largely
proved unfounded.88
Third, in Latin America, Africa, and many countries in Central and
Eastern Europe, the evidence suggests that political economy factors are
the principal impediment to reform.89 This in turn suggests a need to sub-
stantially re-think reform strategies on the part of both domestic and
external proponents of reform in changing the political dynamics of rule of
law reform on both the demand and supply sides of the political equation.
IV. RETHINKING RULE OF LAW REFORM STRATEGIES
In considering appropriate strategies to address the political econ-
omy barriers to rule of law reform, we believe that rule of law advocates
ought to have regard to the following principles and priorities.
1) The need for meaningful, independent, and transparent moni-
toring of the performance of domestic rule of law institutions:
One of the most significant obstacles to effective rule of law reform
is the lack of accurate data surrounding the performance of rule of law
institutions. Much of the data concerning the rule of law performance of
a given country is highly abstract and does not afford precise assessment
of the performance of the various institutions that are implicated in the
87. See Brooks, supra note 23.
88. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION (1992).
89. See CAROTHERS, supra note 28; KAUFMANN, supra note 4.
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enterprise of rule of law building. It is undoubtedly true that if each of a
country's constituent rule of law institutions (judiciary, police, prosecu-
tion, legal profession, etc.) are operating in an efficient, non-corrupt, and
accountable manner, then it is likely that the overall impression that ob-
servers have of the country's rule of law performance will be favorable.
On the other hand, if, as is often the case, the record of institutional per-
formance in a given country is much more mixed (particularly when the
performance of subnational rule of law actors is also considered), then
there is a need for more concrete and precise data to guide the interven-
tions of internal and external rule of law proponents. Specifically,
reformers will need to know which domestic institutions are failing, in
which dimensions, and why, so that nuanced reform measures can be
adopted. To the extent that institutional failure is the product of technical
constraints, then domestic and external rule of law advocates will be able
to focus on providing the resources and expertise necessary to improve
institutional performance. But if institutional failure reflects the resis-
tance of salient domestic interests either inside or outside of the affected
institutions, it is important that evidence of this resistance be publicly
disclosed so as to create reputational costs for these actors. Although
private rule of law monitors currently exist, we believe that effective and
meaningful monitoring and assessment of rule of law institutions is
likely to be politically contentious; therefore, there is a need to create a
credible, non-partisan multilateral institution, perhaps consisting of emi-
nent retired jurists and lawyers (with appropriate staff support), whose
collective reputation would be able to withstand criticism from various
interests whose conduct is impugned by the monitors. Although the
World Bank is a possible candidate for such a monitoring role, we are
concerned that restrictions in its charter on involvement in member
countries' internal politics would limit the capacity of the institution to
discharge this role. In disseminating such information widely and turn-
ing a multitude of citizens into potential auditors, an independent media
can play a critical role.90
2) The need to harness the political pressure that can be exerted
by certain domestic and foreign interest groups in favor of
good and durable rule of law reform:
Accurate and meaningful information is a necessary prerequisite for
effective intervention by sundry rule of law advocates. Once this exists,
then it is necessary for reform proponents to identify prospective allies in
the reform enterprise and to consider how they can be best deployed in
championing the necessary reforms. As we have argued, given that rule
90. See KAUFMANN, supra note 4.
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of law reform is not a technocratic exercise but rather an inherently po-
litical enterprise that is intended to constrain those wielding public
power, it can be predicted that certain vested interest groups will work
strenuously to thwart desired change. In some cases, those resisting re-
form will be officials located within the very institutions that are subject
to reform, and who are currently receiving significant personal benefits
from the arbitrary exercise of their power. In this context, any effort to
constrain or regulate the exercise of their discretion implies a loss of
available rents and will thus elicit a strong reaction against reform. In
other cases, those resisting reform will be found in the executive and/or
legislative branches of government. These individuals will rationally fear
that more effective rule of law institutions will constrain their capacity to
exploit the public weal for their own ends. And yet in other cases, those
resisting reform will be formally outside of government but are the bene-
ficiaries of certain policies or institutional arrangements that serve their
narrow interests at the expense of the broad public interest; for example,
private interest groups that are insulated from responsibility for occupa-
tional health and safety or environmental abuses by virtue of express
governmental edict or who benefit from corrupt allocation of govern-
ment contracts, licences, or corrupt judicial decisionmaking.
Against this backdrop of highly concentrated losses inflicted on cer-
tain interest groups, the question is whether the beneficiaries of reform
will be able to overcome the resistance of these groups to the proposed
changes and be able to insist on welfare-enhancing changes from politi-
cal decisionmakers. In addressing this question, it is important to
acknowledge the many barriers that operate against the reformers. Even
though the proposed changes are almost certainly welfare-enhancing,
those championing rule of law reforms are hindered by the public goods
character of rule of law institutions and by the collective action problems
that arise in securing the necessary resources to mount a successful po-
litical campaign when the beneficiaries of reform have relatively small
individual stakes in the creation of rule of law institutions (at least in
comparison to other more targeted benefits that may be obtained directly
from the executive or legislative branches of government) and are widely
dispersed. Further exacerbating the bleak prospects for effective political
demand for rule of law reform are the high upfront costs that will be
borne by reformers (which are unlikely to be fully recovered if the re-
forms are successfully adopted). As in any democracy, those advocating
rule of law reforms will have to bear non-trivial political lobbying costs
(including the cost of persuading both fellow citizens and politicians of
the merits of their request). In some developing countries, however, the
costs of lobbying are increased substantially because of the risk that en-
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trenched elites will respond to rule of law advocates with violence and/or
arbitrary arrest.
Given this relatively dismal assessment of the prospects of mounting
a successful rule of law campaign at the political level, several implica-
tions follow. First, there is a clear role for foreign citizens and groups
(e.g., NGOs, foundations, foreign bar associations, foreign investors,
bilateral and multilateral donors) to play in supporting nascent domestic
demands for procedural rule of law reform in developing countries. As
we have argued, domestic rule of law reform is likely to be grossly un-
der-supplied because of endemic collective action problems on the
demand side, and if foreigners do not support rule of law reform, it will
be difficult for domestic interests alone to secure socially desired
changes. Further, in contrast to other domestic policy issues where the
merits of desired reforms are more complex, the case for a procedurally
oriented conception of the rule of law is normatively relatively uncontro-
versial and is of universal application and thus does not raise vexing
issues regarding the legitimacy of foreign influence in the domestic po-
litical arena. Second, despite the difficulties entailed in coordinating
political reform activity, domestic reform advocates must invest time and
energy in cobbling together political coalitions that are committed to rule
of law reform. We do not believe that the level of political lobbying ac-
tivity will, for the reasons discussed above, be fully commensurate with
the benefits at stake, but this does not mean that no lobbying will take
place at all. Although for many actors, rule of law reform is an abstract,
remote ideal, there will always be some domestic interest groups who
share a more intense interest in rule of law reform, including entrepre-
neurs, minority groups, citizen groups, NGOs, and domestic investors;
and the key is to mobilize these groups in favor of a shared agenda that is
predicated on the adoption of rule of law reforms. Finally, in considering
rule of law reform, it is important to bear in mind the prospects of both
exit and voice in forcing institutional change. While it is important that
some interest groups exercise their voice directly in the political process
in favor of rule of law reform, the fact that other groups and individuals
are "exiting" the political arena by, for instance, declining to invest in
countries with weak rule of law records will constitute another important
pressure point on domestic politicians. Indeed, it may even be worth
considering how the international community can bolster the prospects
for domestic rule of law reform by limiting the capacity of developing
countries to discriminate among different investor groups, thereby in-
creasing the political pressure brought by exit.9'
91. See Ronald J. Daniels, Defecting on Development: Bilateral Investment Treaties
and the Subversion of the Rule of Law in the Developing World (forthcoming).
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3) The need for foreign governments and international organiza-
tions to bolster pressure brought by domestic reformers by
conditioning other types of desired benefits on meaningful
rule of law reform:
Building on the discussion above, we believe that there is a need for
foreign governments and international institutions to play a more vigor-
ous role in supporting the adoption of procedurally oriented rule of law
arrangements in developing countries by, for instance, insisting on the
achievement of specified rule of law objectives as a condition precedent
for the receipt of certain coveted benefits from the industrialized coun-
tries. Currently, the requirement that newly liberalizing states wishing to
accede to the European Community strengthen the performance of rule
of law institutions and endorse the European Human Rights Convention
constitutes one very effective type of conditionality. Essentially, develop-
ing States are deprived of the benefits of access to markets, regional
assistance programs, and investment unless their rule of law institutions
are sufficiently robust. To be sure, the case for ensuring the achievement
of high rule of law standards reflects in part a concern over the negative
externalities that Member States will experience were weak rule of law
countries permitted to accede to the Community. Similarly, accession
negotiations to the WTO or regional trading blocs or trade preferences
for developing countries can be used as leverage on prospective mem-
bers to promote rule of law reform, at least in targeted areas. And access
to financial assistance from the World Bank, the IMF, regional develop-
ment banks, or bilateral donors can be made similarly conditional.
We believe that any moral squeamishness with using conditionality
in other contexts where concerns over external intrusions into domestic
political sovereignty are salient is more than offset by the universal char-
acter of the procedural conception of the rule of law we have invoked.
Accordingly, we would urge foreign governments and international insti-
tutions to consider ways in which conditionality could be used to fortify
domestic champions of the rule of law. We would also recommend
against the provision of technical rule of law support to those States that
lack the necessary political will and commitment to develop robust rule
of law arrangements. The extension of this support is not only likely to
be ineffective, but, even more fundamentally, will unwittingly provide
normative cover to domestic elites who are under pressure from certain
groups to provide meaningful changes.
4) The need for persistent, clear, and pervasive international re-
inforcement of the normative value of good rule of law
institutions:
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It is easy to become cynical about the prospects for rule of law re-
form in the developing world and to see the only scope for reform as
emanating from naked political pressure. We do not wish to minimize
the salutary role that such pressure can play in provoking meaningful
reform. Yet nor are we anxious to treat political reform as being the sole
byproduct of lobbying activity by affected individuals and groups.
Rather, we believe that ideas do matter in the domestic political process,
and, in particular, the intrinsic and universalistic appeal of the rule of law
will reinforce the lobbying efforts of certain pro-reform lobby groups. It
is here that the international community can play an important role in
declaring clearly and persistently its commitment to the moral force of
the rule of law in promoting a range of vaunted goals. By expressing this
commitment in international conventions, treaties, and other instruments,
additional pressure can be brought to bear on recalcitrant domestic inter-
est groups.
5) The need to devise creative measures that will mitigate the re-
sistance of vested interest groups against rule of law reform:
So far, most of our discussion has focused on ways of supporting (or,
in fact, inducing) demand for rule of law reform in developing countries.
An equally important focus, however, is on the existing suppliers of rule
of law services. If the many actors who are currently involved in a coun-
try's rule of law institutions legitimately fear that they will be summarily
displaced or the illegitimate perquisites of public office eliminated when
new institutions are created, then their resistance to reform is likely to be
all the more intense. That is, if what is at risk for them is not merely the
ability to extract bribes and other perquisites in exchange for their sup-
port, but also their basic livelihood as well, then they can be expected to
intensify their opposition to the proposed changes. Of course, in many
cases, the rapid removal of corrupt rule of law actors is essential to the
basic rehabilitation of these institutions and to the revival of the rule of
law ideal, and there is no scope for their continued tenure. Yet in other
contexts, where existing rule of law actors are inexperienced, ill-trained,
or have engaged in low levels of petty corruption, rule of law advocates
ought to consider whether these individuals can be retained, and their
performance improved through a combination of training, increased
compensation, and the imposition of clearer accountability mechanisms.
If so, it is possible that their resistance to reform can be muted. Alterna-
tively, where existing rule of law actors are ineffective but have not
operated in a patently bad manner, it may be prudent to think about of-
fering transitional assistance (e.g., buy-outs, early retirement benefits,
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relocation, and job training subsidies) that will mitigate their resistance
to the adoption of new institutional arrangements.
In the end, there is no gainsaying Carother's conclusion92 that serious
rule of law reform in many developing countries is likely to be a long-
term and daunting project, demanding both patience and long-term
commitment by rule of law proponents. Recent empirical evidence sug-
gests scant progress worldwide in recent years in improving rule of law
and governance, in controlling corruption, and in improving institutional
quality.93 More particularly, it is an illusion to suppose that even proce-
durally oriented rule of law reform is largely a technical internal or
bureaucratic exercise.94 In fact, it is a profoundly political enterprise with
all the perils and uncertainties for both domestic and foreign rule of law
reform proponents that such an enterprise entails.
92. Carothers, supra note 1.
93. KAUFMANN, RETHINKING GOVERNANCE, supra note 4.
94. Id.
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APPENDIX
RULE OF LAW INDICATORS FOR SELECTED
COUNTRIES, 1996 AND 2002
Country/Territory 1996 2002
Point Estimate Percentile Rank Point Estimate Percentile Rank
Latin America
Argentina 0.27 65.7 -0.73 27.8
Bolivia -0.62 29.5 -0.60 32.5
Brazil -0.24 46.4 -0.30 50
Chile 1.19 86.7 1.30 87.1
Columbia -0.44 36.1 -0.75 26.8
Costa Rica 0.61 74.1 0.67 72.2
Dominican Republic -0.49 33.7 -0.43 42.8
Ecuador -0.38 38.6 -0.60 33
El Salvador -0.45 35.5 -0.46 39.7
Guatemala -0.61 30.1 -0.84 21.6
Honduras -0.81 18.7 -0.79 23.7
Mexico -0.11 55.4 -0.22 52.1
Nicaragua -0.66 25.9 -0.63 32
Panama 0.25 65.1 0.00 55.7
Paraguay -0.48 34.3 -1.12 11.9
Peru -0.33 40.4 -0.44 40.7
Uruguay 0.49 72.3 0.56 69.1
Venezuela -0.62 28.9 -1.04. 13.4
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola -1.36 3.6 -1.56 3.1
Benin -0.01 57.2 -0.42 43.3
Botswana 0.76 81.3 0.72 72.7
Burkina Faso -0.71 23.5 -0.55 34
Burundi -0.18 49.4 -1.49 3.6
Cameroon -1.12 12 -1.28 6.2
Cape Verde 0.08 60.2 0.19 60.3
Central African Republic -0.18 49.4 -0.88 19.6
Chad -0.18 49.4 -0.93 17
Comoros N/A N/A -0.84 20.6
Congo -1.20 6 -1.22 8.2
Congo, Dem. Rep. -1.73 0.6 -1.79 0.5
Cote D'ivoire -0.65 27.1 -1.21 8.8
Equatorial Guinea N/A N/A -1.19 9.3
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Notes:
1. The sources of this table are Daniel Kaufmann et al., Govern-
ance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002 (June 30,
2003, draft for comment, available at http://www.worldbank.
org/wbi/governance/pdf/govmatters3.pdf; The World Bank
Group, GRICS: Governance Research Indicator Country
Snapshot, available at http://info.worldbank.org/govemance/
kkz2002/mcregion.asp). Only the data for 1996 and 2002 is se-
lected in this table for the purpose of this paper.
2. According to the compilers of the World Bank governance
data, which is constructed on the basis of a number of polls of
country experts and surveys of residents, the primary aggre-
gate indicator for rule of law is countries' point estimates
ranging from -2.5 to +2.5. Countries' percentile ranks ranging
from 0 to 100 are also provided at the World Bank GRICS
website and included in this table. Because countries' relative
positions on the aggregate indicators are subject to margins of
error, precise country rankings cannot be inferred from the
World Bank data. It is indicated that the average standard er-
ror of the rule of law indicator is 0.26 for 1996 and 0.19 for
2002.
3. For the purpose of this paper, countries and territories in five
regions/categories are included in this table: Latin America,
Sub-Saharan Africa, the former Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe, Asia (minus Japan and the former Soviet Union re-
publics in Central Asia), and OECD. Following the world
classification by the compilers of the World Bank governance
indicators, Australia and New Zealand are listed under OECD
in this table.
4. N/A in this table stands for "not available."
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